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In the previous article in this series, I had predicted that the
Supreme Court would (1) reverse in Alcan Aluminium Ltd. v.
Franchise Tax Board of California,' a Tax Injunction Act case;2
(2) affirm in Kirkpatrick, Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics,3 a
foreign corrupt practices case raising issues under the Act of State
Doctrine;4 and (3) reverse in Verdugo-Urquidez v. United States,'
a search and seizure case raising issues under the fourth
amendment." The Supreme Court did not disappoint, and at least
for this year, my predictions came true.
In addition to these three cases, the Court decided several other
1. 860 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1988).
2. Kelso, Review of the Supreme Court's 1988-89 Term and Preview of the 1989-90 Term for
the Transnational Practitioner, 2 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 353, 369 (1989).
3. 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988).
4. Kelso, supra note 2, at 372-73.
5. 856 F.2d 1214 (91h Cir. 1988).
6. Kelso, supra note 2, at 375-77.
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cases last term of interest to the transnational practitioner, including
the Court's first case involving the Eurodollar market and an
important personal jurisdiction case.
Of equally great significance is the resignation of Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr., from the Court after 34 years of service.' As will
be discussed more fully below, his replacement, Judge David
Souter, is essentially an unknown quantity here in the United




In Burnham v. Superior Court of California,8 the Court
unanimously held in a divorce action that personal service of a
summons and complaint upon the defendant who was voluntarily
within the state on business and to visit his children was sufficient
to confer personal jurisdiction over that defendant even though the
defendant had no other ties or connections with the state, and the
cause of action did not arise out of the defendant's contacts with
the state.
Justice Scalia, joined by three justices, reached this result by
applying a bright-line rule that personal jurisdiction could always
be obtained by personal service upon a natural person voluntarily
within the state. Justice Brennan, joined by three justices, reached
the same result applying the standards from International Shoe Co.
v. Washington.9 Justice Stevens, who concurred separately, agreed
that there was jurisdiction, but he was unwilling to join either
Justice Scalia or Justice Brennan in their approaches to the case.
395
7. Justice Brennan was appointed by President Eisenhower in 1956.
8. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
9. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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B. Searches and Seizures Overseas and the Fourth Amendment
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,0 the Court held that the
fourth amendment did not apply to the search of an alien's home
outside of the United States when the alien had no substantial ties
with this country. The decision is of special importance to foreign
citizens and corporations in light of recent efforts by the United
States to give extraterritorial effect to some of its criminal laws.
Do not expect your privacy to be protected by the United States
Constitution.
C. Collection of Eurodollar Deposits
In Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Limited," the Court held
that an agreement with respect to the place of repayment of a
Eurodollar deposit (i.e., New York) did not constitute an agreement
with respect to the place of collection of that deposit (i.e., the New
York parent bank) when the foreign branch bank had been
forbidden by the act of a foreign sovereign from repaying the
deposit out of its own assets. Having found that the parties did not
agree upon a place of collection, the Court remanded for a
determination of whether the New York'parent bank is required as
a matter of the applicable law to satisfy the obligation of its foreign
branch bank. The case preserves the distinction made in the
banking industry between the place of repayment and place of
collection, an important concept to the international banking
community in light of the risk of nonpayment of foreign deposits.
D. The Tax Injunction Act
In Franchise Tax Board of California v. Alcan Aluminum, Ltd.,
the Court held that the Tax Injunction Act barred a federal suit by
a foreign parent challenging California's unitary taxing scheme
10. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
11. 110 s. Ct. 2034 (1990).
12. 110 S. Ct. 661 (1990).
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when the wholly-owned United States subsidiary could raise the
parent's legal claims in a suit that had already been filed in state
court. The case is another reminder to practitioners that state court
remedies should be given serious consideration before filing suit in
federal court.
E. The Act of State Doctrine
The Court unanimously held in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v.
Environmental Tectonics Corp.'3 that the act of state doctrine, did
not apply unless a United States court would be required to declare
invalid (or otherwise ignore) the official act of a foreign sovereign.
The case involved commercial bribery of a foreign official, and the
most important practical effect of the Court's holding is to permit
most litigation under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to proceed
free from the shackles of the act of state doctrine.
II. REVIEW OF THE 1989-90 TERM
A. Burnham v. Superior Court of California - Personal
Jurisdiction Over A Natural Person Based Upon Personal
Service Within The State
1. The Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court's jurisdiction jurisprudence has been widely
criticized as lacking in predictive value.' The "minimum
13. 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990).
14. The scholarly output on the topic of judicial jurisdiction is simply enormous. Recent
critiques of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence are unanimously of the opinion that the state of the
law is at present uncertain and confused. See, e.g., Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream
of Commerce Theory: A Reappraisal and a Revised Approach, 77 KY. U. 243 (1989); Morton,
Contacts, Fairness and State Interests: Personal Jurisdiction After Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court of California, 9 PACE L. REV. 451 (1989); VanDercreek, Jurisdiction Over the Person
- The Progency of Pennoyer and the Future of Asahi, 13 NOVA L. REv. 1287 (1989); Stravitz,
Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C.L. REV. 729
(1988); Paretzky, A New Approach to Jurisdictional Questions in Transnational Litigation in U.S.
Courts, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L 663 (1988); Comment, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court: Stream of Commerce or Swamp?, 40 RuTERs L. REv. 999 (1988); Note, Personal
397
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contacts" and "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" tests, which, prior to the Court's decision this term were
by almost all accounts set in concrete in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,15 appeal to the chancellor's intellect in their beguiling
simplicity. Unfortunately, the very characteristics that make the
International Shoe tests attractive to the fair-minded also make
them virtually useless to the legal practitioner and trial court judge
faced with the very concrete question, "Does the court have
jurisdiction over the defendant?" To offer as an answer to this
question, "Yes, if it is fair," is, in many cases, to give no answer
at all.
Yet in case after case, the Court held that International Shoe was
the starting point for analysis of jurisdiction questions. 6 When the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts was promulgated in 1970, it
identified a single principle of judicial jurisdiction: "A state has
power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a person if the person's
relationship to the state is such as to make the exercise of such
jurisdiction reasonable." 7
Despite the seeming all-inclusiveness of International Shoe,
scholars were careful for a time not to throw out all pre-
International Shoe bases for jurisdiction -'even those that might
not survive an International Shoe analysis. For example, the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts in Section 28 gave its blessing
to jurisdiction based upon personal service over a natural person
voluntarily present in the jurisdiction, even though the person's
presence was unrelated to the cause of action and was only
Jurisdiction and the Due Process Clause: An Evaluation of the Fairness Factors, 19 PAC. L J. 1459
(1988); Note, Civil Procedure - Muddying the Stream of Commerce Theory - Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court, 36 U. KAN. L REv. 191 (1987).
15. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
16. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Rush v. Savchuk, 444
U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950).
17. RESTATaMENT (SECoND) oF CoNFLicTs § 24 (1971).
1990/Review of the Supreme Court's 1989-90 Term,
transitory.18 Although giving its blessing to what is often called
"tag" jurisdiction, the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts recognized that the rule might not be entirely consistent
with International Shoe,' thus suggesting that International Shoe
might not be the last word on jurisdiction after all.
But the all-inclusiveness of International Shoe was, in the
opinion of most commentators, finally confirmed in Shaffer v.
Heitner," where the Court wrote that "all assertions of state-court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth
in International Shoe and its progeny." 21  In the comments to
Section 5 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the Reporter
suggested that the Restatement (Second) of Conflict's prior approval
of "tag" jurisdiction was doubtful in light of Shaffer.'
Most of the Court's jurisdiction cases have arisen in a domestic
context with citizens of one state suing citizens from another state.
In only two recent cases has the Court faced jurisdictional disputes
with transnational implications. In Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia v. Hall' and Asahi. Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court of California, the Court considered jurisdiction over
foreign corporations. Neither case, however, cleared the muddied
waters. Helicopteros indicated that the transnational nature of a
case might make a difference in the International Shoe balance, but
that holding, while undoubtedly welcomed by transnationalists,
only exacerbated the confusion. In Asahi, the Court was unable to
18. ld. at § 28. comment a (1971) explained as follows:
Physical presence in the state was the traditional basis of judicial jurisdiction at common
law. It is immaterial that the individual is only temporarily in the state. His presence in
the state, even for an instant, gives the state judicial jurisdiction over him.
The rule that physical presence is a basis of judicial jurisdiction may result at times in a
defendant being compelled to stand suit in a state to which he has no relationship other than
the fact that he was served with process while passing through that state's territory.
19. "'It can also be contended that the rule is inconsistent with the basic principle of
reasonableness which underlies the field of judicial jurisdiction." Md at comment a (1971).
20. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
21. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
22. REsTATEENT (SEcOND) oF JUDGMENTS § 5 comment a (1982).
23. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
24. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
399
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 3
form a majority on a critical jurisdiction issue that routinely faces
transnational corporations: whether jurisdiction could be based
upon the mere act of putting into the stream of commerce a
product which injures a plaintiff in a foreseeable jurisdiction. In
particular, the Court could not agree whether "purposeful
availment" of the forum was necessary."
2. Burnham v. Superior Court
The decision in Burnham v. Superior Court of California,6 may
signal a clarifying change in the law, at least with respect to one
traditional basis of jurisdiction: service of process upon a natural
person who is voluntarily within the jurisdiction. 7
The defendant's wife, who resided in California with their
children, filed a suit for divorce against the defendant in a
California court. While visiting California from New Jersey on
business and to see his children, the defendant was served with a
California summons and a copy of the petition for divorce.
The defendant entered what amounts to a special appearance in
the California suit to challenge jurisdiction.u This challenge was
25. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion (joined by Rehnquist, Powell, and Scalia) expressed
the view that "minimum contacts" could be satisfied only if there had been a "purposeful
availment" of the forum. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033 (O'Connor, J.). Justice Brennan's opinion
(joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun) rejected the "purposeful availment" test in favor of tie
stream of commerce approach. Id. 107 S. Ct. at 1035 (Brennan, J.).
The retirement of Justice Brennan will provide the Court with an opportunity to revisit (and
hopefully decide) this important issue.
26. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
27. Although it should be obvious from the way in which the issue has been stated in the text,
it bears emphasis that Burnham may not be relevant to resolving issues of jurisdiction over non-
natural persons, such as corporations. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig,' The Transient Rule of Personal
Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 293 n.27 (1956).
"28. Ordinarily, by entering an "appearance" in ongoing litigation, a person submits him or
herself to the judicial jurisdiction of the state. R.sTATEMENT (SEcoND) op CoNFucrs § 33. A
"special appearance" (as opposed to a "general appearance") occurs when a person appears solely
for the purpose of challenging the court's assertion of jurisdiction. The Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts § 81 states the general rule followed by all states: "A state will not exercise judicial
jurisdiction over an individual who appears in the action for the sole purpose of objecting that there
is no jurisdiction over him."
In California, a challenge on personal jurisdiction grounds is made by filing a motion to quash.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 418.10(a)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
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rejected by the California state courts. The Supreme Court granted
a writ of certiorari and unanimously affirmed the judgments of the
California courts that jurisdiction existed. 9
The unanimous affirmance by the Supreme Court indicates that
this was in some respects an easy case. What makes the case
interesting is not so much the result as the vastly different approach
to jurisdictional questions taken by Justice Scalia (joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and Kennedy) and Justice
Brennan (joined by Justices Marshall, Blackman, and O'Connor).
The Court was denied a majority because Justice Stevens concurred
separately without any apparent rationale," leaving the rest of us
guessing as to the Court's ultimate rationale.3
Justice Scalia's approach can be fairly accurately summarized as
follows: if it was good enough for his grand-father, it is good
enough for him. More precisely, so long as a particular method of
securing jurisdiction has been generally and widely approved and
used by state courts, that "pedigree" is sufficient to establish the
constitutionality of the assertion of jurisdiction, and it is not
necessary to analyze the assertion of jurisdiction further under
International Shoe. Since, as Justice Scalia demonstrates in his
thorough opinion, courts and commentators of the past (although
not the recent past)32 have been essentially unanimous in their
29. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
30. Much of the current unsettled state of the law can be attributed to Justice Stevens'
unwillingness to come down on one side of the fence or the other. He concurred separately in
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (Stevens, J., concurring), Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court
of California, 480 U.S. 102, 121 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part), and now in Burnham.
31. The resignation of Justice Brennan and confirmation of Judge Souter will give the Court
another opportunity to forge a majority in this area. Judge Souter's views on jurisdiction are
unknown. Although he served on the New Hampshire Supreme Court for some seven years, that
court did not cite International Shoe even once during his tenure. Press reports suggest that Souter
models himself on Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. To the extent that Souter has an affinity for the
19th century legal mind, this would suggest that he would join Scalia, whose opinion in Burnham
relies heavily on 19th century style and precedent.
32. Recent cases and commentary by scholars have questioned whether "tag" jurisdiction is
constitutional under International Shoe. See, e.g., Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of U.S.A., 765
F.2d 42,46-47 (3d Cir. 1985); Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305,
310-14 (9 N.D. Ill. 1986); Bershaw v. Sarbacher,,40 Wash. App. 653, 657, 700 P.2d 347 (1985).
See, e.g., Bernstine, Shaffer v. Helmer: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Personam
Jurisdiction?, 25 V.. L. REv. 38, 47-68 (1979-80); Brilmayer, A General Look at General
Jurisdiction, 66 TEx. L. REv. 723,748-55 (1988); Von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General
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opinion that personal service upon a natural person voluntarily
within the jurisdiction suffices to confer jurisdiction on the courts
of that state, the due process limitations from International Shoe
are necessarily satisfied. This is so even as to causes of action
totally unrelated to the defendant's presence within the state and
even though the defendant may have been present within the
jurisdiction for only fifteen minutes. The only apparent exceptions
to Scalia's rule involve cases in which the defendant is not
voluntarily within the state.33
Justice Brennan's opinion, which fully embraces International
Shoe, is premised largely upon a rejection of hard and fast rules
that admit of no exceptions and that apparently would admit of no
further development in the law. According to Justice Brennan,
"[t]he critical insight of Shaffer is that all rules of jurisdiction,
even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary notions of due
process." '  Brennan criticizes Scalia for falling into the
Blackstonian fallacy of asserting that the law has reached
perfection and is in no further need of development.' Scalia
undoubtedly recognizes that change and development is possible.
For Scalia, however, that change and development must be initiated
Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U.L Rnv. 279,300-07 (1983). Justice Scalia rejects these
cases and articles as reflecting a misunderstanding of International Shoe and as being incorrectly
inspired by a misplaced reliance on dicta in Shaffer. Burnham, I10 S. Ct. at 2113 & 2115-16.
33. Justice Scalia does not in his opinion explicitly hold that presence must be voluntary for
his rule to apply. Instead, he carefully refers only to "personal service upon a physically present
defendant" (as opposed to a "voluntarily present defendant"). Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2111. It is
thus possible that Justice Scalia would find no due process violation even if a state were to assert
jurisdiction over a person who was brought into a state by force.
On the other hand, Justice Scalia takes note in his opinion that "most states" did not permit
jurisdiction to be asserted over "individuals who were brought into the forum by force or fraud...
or who were there as a party or witness in unrelated judicial proceedings." Id. at 2112. Since an
assertion ofjurisdiction in these cases would not be blessed with a long "pedigree," the Court would
presumably analyze such cases under the International Shoe guidelines.
34. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
35. "Even Justice Scalia's opinion concedes that sometimes courts may discard 'traditional'
rules when they no longer comport with contemporary notions of due process. For example,
although, beginning with the Romans, judicial tribunals for over a millennium permitted jurisdiction
to be acquired by force ... by the 19th century, as Justice Scalia acknowledges, this method had
largely disappeared.... I do not see why Justice Scalia's opinion assumes that there is no further
progress to be made and that the evolution of our legal system, and the society in which it operates,
ended 100 years ago." Id. at 2121 n.3.
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by the states themselves as each state judges the fairness of such
jurisdiction.' Brennan, by contrast, would reserve to the Court
the power to judge the fairness of each exercise of jurisdiction.
This does not mean that the results which Brennan and Scalia
would reach in particular cases is necessarily different, far from it.
The bulk of Brennan's concurring opinion explains why, as a
general rule, jurisdiction based upon personal service of a natural
person voluntarily within the state does not violate due process.
But to reach this result, Brennan, unlike Scalia, balances the
benefits and burdens of presence jurisdiction. In the end, Brennan
must leave open the possibility that in a particular case, jurisdiction
based upon presence would be fundamentally unfair.
The main difference, then, between Scalia's and Brennan's
approach, is the difference between a rule-based system in which
the existence of certain material facts triggers application of the
rule and a factor-based system in which factual circumstances are
balanced against each other in light of an overall legal principle.
Practitioners would probably prefer Scalia's approach because it
appears to provide hard and fast answers to a critical and early
question in the course of all litigation.
Of course the apparent clarity and simplicity of Scalia's rule-
based approach may ultimately break down. As already noted,
Scalia may himself recognize an exception when a person is
involuntarily within a state." And one wonders whether the case
involving an airline passenger being served while the plane travels
over the state will pass Justice Scalia's test. Mechanically applying
the common law, it could be argued that being present over a state
36. Scalia does not in his opinion clearly set forth a standard for judging the moment when
changes in state law might trigger a new due process standard. If a minority of states rejected tag
jurisdiction, that would not seem to be a rejection of the "tradition" that Scalia identifies. Suppose
26 states (one more than half) rejected tag jurisdiction? Scalia could still reasonably argue that the
"tradition" remains good law in a substantial number of states. Suppose 45 states reject "tag"
jurisdiction? This might be enough to trigger a new due process rule that would reject tag
jurisdiction.
The closest that Scalia comes to formulating a test is when he notes in dictum near the end of his
opinion that "nothing prevents an overwhelming majority of [states] from [rejecting "tag"
jurisdiction], with the consequence that the 'traditional notions of fairness' that this Court applies may
change." Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119 (emphasis added).
37. See supra note 32.
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is the same thing as being present in the state, and that service
should therefore be sufficient to confer jurisdiction?
On the other hand, the nineteenth century cases on which Scalia
most heavily relied obviously did not consider the question of
service on airplanes, and it is thus arguable that service in this type
of case does not have a sufficiently developed "pedigree". If,
service in an airplane is considered to be a novel or, in Scalia's
words, "non-traditional" form of service, then International Shoe
would apply."
As this discussion should illustrate, although Scalia's rule may
be clear when it applies, it may remain unclear to which cases the
rule will apply. There is little that Scalia can do about this type of
uncertainty, which is inherent in the common law process of
applying general rules to specific (and new) fact situations.
Brennan's approach has a different, and perhaps more serious,
problem. Although it is clear according to Brennan's approach
when International Shoe applies (i.e., it applies to all cases), the
results under International Shoe in specific fact situations may not
be clear.'
There are several reasons why this case should be of interest to
transnational practitioners. First, Justice Scalia's opinion represents
an explicit attempt to clarify the law of jurisdiction in the United
States. Burnham deals only with personal service upon natural
persons, and does not deal with assertions of jurisdiction over
corporations or other legal. entities. We can hope, however, that
Scalia's search for clear rules in this area will carry over into the
next jurisdiction case involving transnational corporations."'
Second, to the extent that Justice Scalia's approach admits of no
exceptions, the case should be of concern to international travellers.
There are a limited number of ports of call for the international air
38. That was the court's analysis and conclusion in Grace v. MacAnhur, 170 F. Supp. 442
(E.D. Ark. 1959).
39. Burnham, 110 S. C. at 2119. As already noted above, it may be that assertions of
jurisdiction over foreign corporations will fall outside of Scalia's rule and will continue to be
analyzed under International Shoe and its progeny.
40. See supra note 13.
41. Of course clarity can be achieved only if the Court issues a majority opinion.
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traveller. If Scalia's approach is applied mechanically - and that,
after all, is supposed to be one benefit of clear rules - then a
person flying from London to Kansas by way of New York City,
may, upon clearing customs, be served with a New York summons.
It is possible, of course, that the Court would not follow the
analysis in Burnham in cases involving foreign defendants. In
Asahi and Helicopteros, the Court indicated some sensitivity to the
problem of extending American notions of jurisdiction to cover
foreign nationals. It is thus conceivable that the Court could treat
cases involving foreign nationals differently from cases involving
United States residents. When the case involves U.S. residents, the
Court could apply the Burnham rule; when the case involves
foreign nationals, the Court could revert to International Shoe.42
But until the Court speaks to this issue, the next person who tries
to hand you something in an American airport or in a plane flying
over the United States may be a process server. Travellers beware!
B. Verdugo-Urquidez v. United States - The Fourth Amendment
Does Not Protect A Non-Resident Alien Against A Search of
His Home in a Foreign Country
This case involved the joint search by U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) agents and Mexican law enforcement officials of
two homes in Mexico, both owned by Verdugo-Urquidez, a
Mexican national. The district court held that the fourth
amendment had been violated by the search and that the evidence
obtained in the search should be suppressed. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that DEA officers were
required to obtain a search warrant from a United States magistrate
before conducting as a joint venture with foreign law enforcement
42. The Court could justify distinguishing the cases by noting that assertions of jurisdiction
over foreign nationals is a relatively recent phenomenon that does not have a sufficiently developed
"pedigree" to make it constitutional in all circumstances. In the absence of such a "pedigree," the
fall-back analysis would be International Shoe.
405
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 3
officers the search of a foreign citizen's home.43 In reaching its
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit made three critical holdings. First, it
held that the defendant could raise a fourth amendment challenge
even though the defendant was a Mexican national.'M Second, it
held that the search was a "joint venture" between the United
States and Mexican officials, and was thus subject to fourth
amendment scrutiny. ' Third, it held the DEA agents were not
entitled to rely upon the statements by Mexican officials that the
search had been properly authorized, and the DEA agents were
instead required to obtain a search warrant from a United States
CoUrt.
46
As predicted, the Supreme Court has reversed, 6-3, with the
majority opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, separate
concurring opinions by Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens, and
dissenting opinions by Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun.47
Although the result, a reversal, was not a surprise, the Court's
rationale may come as quite a shock to many people, and
especially the transnational practitioner.
The fourth amendment provides as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.""
The proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures and
the companion exclusionary rule have been a powerful weapon
which criminal defendants have used to force the exclusion of often
43. 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988). On the Ninth Circuit's opinion, see generally, Note, The
ExtraterritorialApplicability of the Fourth Amendment, 102 HARv. L REv. 1672 (1989); Note, The
International Silver Platter and the "'Shocks the Conscience"' Test: U.S. Law Enforcement Overseas,
67 WASH. U. L.Q. 489, 501-05 (1989).
44. 856 F.2d at 1218-24.
45. Id. at 1224-28.
46. Id. at 1228-30.
47. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (Rehnquist, CJ.); 110 S. Ct.
at 1066 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); 110 S.
Ct. at 1068 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 110 S. Ct. at 1077 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist was joined in his opinion by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justice
Brennan was joined in his dissenting opinion by Justice Marshall.
48. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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very incriminating evidence. 9 Reacting in part to criticism of
some of the excesses of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court
has, in recent years, rewritten its fourth amendment jurisprudence.
For example, the Court has imposed a "standing" requirement that
effectively prevents a criminal defendant from invoking the fourth
amendment in certain circumstances (such as when the government
has unreasonably searched a third party).-' The Court now permits
in some circumstances the introduction of evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment when police officers acted in
good faith. 1 The Court has also modified its definition of what
constitutes a "reasonable" search so as to permit certain
warrantless searches that, under prior law, might have violated the
fourth amendment. 2 The Court has expanded the independent
source doctrine, which gives the police a chance to do it right the
second time around. 3 And the Court has narrowed the definition
of what constitutes a search s
In Verdugo, the Court did not need to call upon any of these
49. There is a healthy literature on the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule, including
several books dedicated entirely to the topic. See, e.g., L HmscHmL, FouRTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
(1979); R. DAVIS, FinmuRL SEARCHEs AND SEMzURS (1964). A recent review of the exclusionary
rule contains ample citations to the available secondary literature. See Note, Resurrecting the Wof.
An Analysis of the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 60 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 716 (1986).
50. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). See generally Comment, Parties Entitled
to Invoke the Exclusionary Rule: Fourth Amendment Standing in Transition, 51 Miss. UJ. 771
(1981).
51. See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (applying good faith exception to reasonable
reliance upon a statute which authorized warrantless administrative searches); United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984) (applying good faith exception to reasonable reliance upon a search warrant
issued by a neutral magistrate); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (applying good faith
exception to reasonable reliance upon a magistrate's assurances that necessary changes would be
made to the form of a warrant). See, e.g., Uchida, Bynum, Rogan & Murasky, Acting in Good Faith:
The Effects of United States v. Leon On the Police and Courts, 30 ARmZ. L REv. 467 (1988); Note,
Criminal Procedure - Expansion of the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule - United
States v. Owens, 848 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1988), 62 TEMP. L. REv. 1351 (1989).
52. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990) (permitting warrantless search of home when
officers reasonably believe the person who has consented to search possesses common authority over
the premises with the owner); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (permitting warrantess
search of garbage bags left on curb); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (permitting
warrantless surveillance of fenced backyard from a plane flying at 1,000 feet).
53. Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988). See generally Note, Fourth Amendment
-An Acceptable Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule, 79 J. CItM. L. & CRIMINoLoGY 647 (1988).
54. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (exposure of luggage to a dog trained to
locate drugs does not constitute a search).
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exceptions. Instead, in an opinion that emphasized a territorial
view of sovereign obligations, a majority held that the fourth
amendment did not even apply. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court emphasized the facts that (1) Verdugo was an alien who
lacked substantial connections with the United States and (2) the
search was conducted on foreign soil.
With respect to Verdugo's constitutional status, the Court
concluded that the phrase "the people" in the fourth amendment
is "a term of art" that did not include "aliens outside of the
United States territory. ' 'ss Under this construction, an alien
located outside of the United States may not claim the protections
of the fourth amendment. But even if the alien is temporarily
within the United States at the time the foreign search occurs,
physical presence is not enough to bring that alien within the class
of "the people." Instead, the protections of the fourth amendment
are triggered only if an alien within this country also has
"developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered
part of that community." '56
This additional qualification was critical for decision of the case
because Verdugo was actually present in the United States at the
time of the search of his home in Mexico, having been lawfully
brought into the United States against.his will by Mexican police
and held in the United States by police authorities. The majority
discounted this presence as "not of the sort to indicate any
substantial connection with our country. '" 7
The Court's analysis did not end, however, with the observation
that Verdugo (an alien with no substantial connections with the
United States) could not claim the protections of the fourth
amendment. The Court also took pains to note that there was no
55. 110 S. CL at 1061.
56. L The Court does not indicate precisely what connections would be enough to be judged
"'substantial." There are suggestions in the opinion that a voluntary presence in the United States
along with the acceptance of -'some societal obligations," might be enough. 110 S. Ct. at 1065.
This would indicate that an alien who is voluntarily present in the country and who has accepted
.'some societal obligations" could claim the protections of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments.
Cf. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (assuming, but not deciding, that aliens present
in the United States are protected by the fourth amendment).
57. 110 S. Ct. at 1064.
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indication that the fourth amendment was intended to apply to
anything other than "domestic matters."" Conceivably, then, the
fourth amendment would not apply to the search of any home in a
foreign country even if that home were owned by a United States
citizen." Such a holding would be supported by one of the
themes struck at the end of the Court's opinion: that applying the
fourth amendment to restrict government searches and seizures
overseas might conflict with overriding national interest, especially
in the context of armed intervention abroad.' The Court thus has
left open the possibility that the fourth amendment simply is
inapplicable to anything other than searches within the United
States."'
The decision in Verdugo is of great importance to transnational
practitioners. The extra-territorial application of United States law
always raises controversy.' With Verdugo, United States officials
may now attempt to enforce those laws using techniques of search
and seizure without being limited by the fourth amendment. As a
result of Verdugo, United States officials no longer must satisfy
fourth amendment requirements of reasonableness before
conducting such a search; the only limitation would seem to come
58. Verdugo-Urquidez, II0 S. Ct. at 1061.
59. Justice Kennedy in particular noted the practical and conceptual difficulties with applying
a warrant requirement to an overseas search. 110 S. Ct. at 1067-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The
Court has granted a writ of certiorari to consider this issue in Powell v. Parsons, No. 89-1672, 59
U.S.LW. 3029.
60. 110 S. C. at 1065-66. Justice Kennedy also noted in his separate concurrence that "'[t]he
absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue warrants, the differing and perhaps
unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to
cooperate with foreign officials all indicate that the fourth amendment's warrant requirement should
not apply in Mexico as it does in this country." 110 S. CL at 1068. This analysis would suggest
that Justice Kennedy would not apply the fourth amendment to any foreign search, although Justice
Kennedy explicitly notes that "'[t]he rights of a citizen, as to whom the United States has continuing
obligations, are not presented by this case." Id.'
61. In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), the Court held that the fifth and sixth amendments
protected a United States citizen stationed abroad. Because the fifth and sixth amendments are
drafted slightly differently from the fourth amendment (a difference noted by the Court in Verdugo-
Urzuidez), it remains open whether the fourth amendment also protects United States citizens abroad.
Several lower courts have extended fourth amendment protections to United States citizens in the
context of searches abroad. United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1264 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979); United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1978).
62. See Orundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of United States
Law, 14 INT'L LAw 257 (1980).
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from the foreign governments' willingness to cooperate with United
States officials6' and other possible constitutional limitations, such
as the fifth amendment's due process clause." The fifth
amendment's due process clause is, however, notably more
generous to the Government than is the fourth amendment's more
specific limitations.
C. Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Limited - Repayment of
Eurodollar Debts Out Of Parent Banks' General Funds
Given the uncertainty of world affairs and the difficulty in
predicting the acts of sovereign nations, one might think that
sophisticated businesspersons operating in the transnational arena
would be careful to include in multi-million dollar contracts a
clause which specifies what is to happen when performance of the
contract is made impossible by the acts of a foreign sovereign -
that is, a clause which allocates what is often referred to as the
"sovereign risk." At least in the banking industry, this apparently
was not the case, however, as Citibank; N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia
63. For example, Switzerland agreed early in 1990 to turnover to the U.S. what otherwise
would have been secret information concerning Swiss bank accounts allegedly used by Manuel
Noriega. See Swiss to Hand Bank Secrets to U.S., The Financial Times, Jan. 18. 1990, at 2, § 1.
64. The Court's analysis strongly suggests that an alien outside of the United States cannot
claim the protections of the fifth or sixth amendments. 110 S. Ct. at 1062-63. But once an alien is
subjected to United States judicial jurisdiction (e.g., when placed on trial in the United States), then
the fifth and sixth amendments would be applicable. As the Court noted, violations of the fifth and
sixth amendments take place at trial, while a violation of the fourth amendment is complete at the
time of the unreasonable search. 110 S. Ct. at 1060. With respect to the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination, the Court noted that "'conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial
may ultimately impair that right." Id. Thus, even if the fourth amendment is not applicable to a
foreign search, it remains open to argue that the circumstances of the foreign search were so
outrageous as to "shock the conscience" in violation of the fifth amendment. See United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
Although the Court does not discuss the fourteenth amendment in its opinion, it seems highly
likely that if a person would not be protected under the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments, that
person would also not be protected under the fourteenth amendment. The Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment tracks the language of the fifth amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of
the fourteenth amendment is, if anything, even narrower in its application, since as drafted, it
provides that a State may not deprive "any person within Its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). The emphasized language does not appear
in the Due Process Clause.
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Ltd makes clear.'
This case involves deposits, repayment and collection in the
Eurodollar market. In 1983, Wells Fargo Asia Limited ("WFAL")
(a Singapore-chartered bank wholly owned by Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., a United States-chartered bank) agreed to make two, $1
million time deposits in Citibank/Manila, a branch office of
Citibank, N.A. (a United States-chartered bank). In the wonderful
world of modern banking, no money actually changes hands in
these transactions, and the situs of the accounts is nowhere near the
Philippines. Instead, the "deposit" is accomplished by means of
an electronic wire transfer from WFAL's account with a New York
correspondent bank to Citibank/Manila's account with another New
York correspondent bank. At the end of the time deposit, the
"money" plus interest will be transferred back to WFAL's account
with its New York correspondent bank. The details of this
transaction were confirmed in an exchange of telexes.'
Before the time for repayment arrived, the Philippine government
restricted repayments of principal on all foreign obligations due to
foreign banks, requiring government approval of all such
payments.' Because of this restriction, Citibank/Manila refused
to repay WFAL when the time deposit matured, claiming that the
new Philippine law made performance impossible. WFAL filed
suit in the federal court for the Southern District of New York
claiming that Citibank New York was liable for the repayment of
65. 110 S. Ct. 2034 (1990).
66. WFALs telex to Citibank/Manila read: "'We shall instruct Wells Fargo Bk Int'l New York
our correspondent please pay to our a/c with Wells Fargo Bk Int'l New York to pay to Citibank NA
customer's correspondent USD 1,000,000.' 110 S. Ct. at 2037. Citibank/Manila's telexes to WFAL
read: "Please remit US Dlr 1,000,000 to our account with Citibank New York. At maturity we
remit US DIr 1,049,444.44 to your account with Wells Fargo Bank Intl Corp NY through Citibank
New York." Id.
67. This new rule was contained in an Oct. 15, 1983, Memorandum to Authorized Ageni Banks
(MAAB 47): "Any remittance of foreign exchange for repayment of principal on all foreign
obligations due to foreign banks and/or financial institutions, irrespective of maturity, shall be
submitted to the Central Bank [of the Philippines] through the Management of External Debt and
Investment Accounts Department (MEDIAD) for prior approval." Id. at 2038. This Memorandum
was issued during the period of political and economic turmoil that existed in the Philippines shortly
after the murder of Senator Benigno Acquino in August 1983.
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.WFAL's funds."
Evidence presented to the trial court established that there was
a distinction in the banking community between "place of
repayment," which refers to the physical location where wire
transfers take place, and "place of collection," which refers to the
place or places where the depositor may look for satisfaction. The
parties had agreed only upon a place of repayment in their contract,
and had said nothing about collection. Accordingly, the contract
was silent on the issue of whether WFAL could look to Citibank
N.A. for its funds.'
Because the parties had not in their agreement explicitly
indicated what would happen in the event that the Philippine
government did something which made repayment by
Citibank/Manila impossible, it was left up to the courts to decide
how the situation should be handled based upon an implied term in
the contract. 70 A term may be implied in a contract either by the
conduct of the parties and the surrounding. circumstances, a course
of conduct or custom in the industry, or as a matter of law.7
There was no evidence with respect to the parties conduct and
surrounding circumstances, and the evidence was in conflict
concerning industry practice and understanding.' The trial court
held that the facts did not support an implied term obligating
Citibank N.A. to satisfy Citibank/Manila's obligation.73 The
Second Circuit came to a different conclusion, focusing on the
68. Id. at 2038. While litigation was pending, Citibank/Manla secured the approval of the
Central Bank of the Philippines to pay interest to WFAL and to pay principal to the extent that it
could make such payments out of non-Philippine assets held by Citibank/Manila. Citibank/Manila.
paid WFAL $934,000, and the remainder, $1,066,000, remained in dispute. Id.
69. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals indicated in its opinion that the place of collection
included, as a matter of law, the place of repayment unless there was an agreement to the contrary.
Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.2d 657, 660-61 (2d Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court
disagreed with the Second Circuit's analysis and preserved for the banking industry the important
distinction between the place of repayment and the place of collection. Wells Fargo Asia La, 110
S. Ct. at 2040. Correcting this error was probably the most important aspect of the Supreme Court's
decision.
70. Citibank apparently modified its confirmation slips in response to this litigation. See Wells
Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, 660 F. Supp. 946, 951 ($.D.N.Y. 1987).
71. 110 S. Ct. at 2039.
72. 660 F. Supp. at 950; 695 F. Supp. at 1452-53.
73. Id.
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terms of the contract providing for repayment in New York.74
Over six years after the deposit had matured, the Supreme Court
issued its opinion. It held, citing the "clearly erroneous" standard
which limits appellate review of trial court factual findings, that the
Second Circuit had erred in essentially overturning the trial court's
factual finding that there was no implied agreement putting
Citibank N.A. on the hook.75 Since there was no term implied by
the facts, the only issue remaining in the case was whether such a
term would be implied by law. The Supreme Court remanded the
case to the Second Circuit for a determination of what law applies
and whether that law would impose upon Citibank N.A. an
obligation to pay WFAL.76
The Supreme Court's holding here is, as Justice Stevens noted in
his short dissent, "narrow."" Indeed, the decision is so narrow,
that Chief Justice Rehnquist complained in a short concurring
opinion that the Court had even granted certiorari in the case.78
The importance of the case is certainly not its holding. Rather, the
lesson to be learned is that leaving obvious issues open in a multi-
million dollar agreement is going to be costly, because litigation to
resolve the open issue will drag on for years, and the ultimate
judicial resolution is far from clear. In a world where sovereigns
come and go and laws respecting foreign investment and trade are
subject to constant and dramatic revision, transnational practitioners
are well advised in transnational contracts to allocate explicitly the
risk of loss in the event of change of foreign law.
74. 852 F.2d at 660.
75. 110S.CLat2040-41.
76. Id. at 2042. The district court had earlier found that New York law applied, and that under
New York law, Citibank N.A. was obligated to pay the debt of its Philippine branch. 695 F. Supp.
1450, 1453-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The Second Circuit on remand now will consider the correctness
of these findings.
77. 110 S. Ct. at 2043 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 2042 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
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D. Franchise Tax Board of California v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd.
- Tax Injunction Act Bars Suit In Federal Court By Foreign
Parent When Subsidiary May Raise Claims In State Court
One of the more serious commercial and trade disputes between
the United States and foreign nations concerns the tax laws of
several states which utilize a "unitary" tax approach in computing
corporate tax.7 A unitary tax approach generally involves
ignoring formal corporate structure in determining corporate
earnings in favor of an analysis based upon the "unitary business"
which a corporation engages in, whether by itself or through
affiliated companies.
A unitary taxing scheme risks overstating the income attributable
to operations within the taxing state. Since a systematic
overstatement of domestic income imposes a burden on interstate
commerce (by imposing a special burden on out-of-state affiliated
companies), unitary taxing schemes would be subject to
constitutional scrutiny under -the commerce clause and foreign
commerce clause. The Supreme Court held in Container Corp. v.
Franchise Tax Board,"0 and Mobil Oil Co. v. Commissioner of
Taxes,8' that a unitary taxing scheme does not impose an
unreasonable burden on interstate or foreign commerce, but the
Court reserved the question whether the application of a unitary
taxing scheme to a domestic subsidiary of a foreign parent violates
the foreign commerce clause's proscription against multiple
taxation and impairment of federal uniformity.'
79. England, for example, has authorized its treasury department to retaliate by denying a
United Kingdom tax credit to United States companies with substantial operations in unitary tax
states. United Kingdom Finance Act of 1987, New Clause 27. An amicus brief filed on behalf of
the Member States of the European Communities and the Governments of Australia, Japan, and
Switzerland characterizes the resolution of the issue as one of "vital importance to the fifteen
countries and to their future economic and commercial relations with the U.S." See Alean
Aluminium LUd. v. Franchise Tax Board State of California, 860 F.2d 688 n.11 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd.
110 S. Ct. 661 (1990).
80. 463 U.S. 159, 184 (1983).
81. 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980).
82. See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 189 n.26 & 195 n.32. See also Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
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In Franchise Tax Board of California v. Alcan Aluminium,
Ltd.,83 the domestic subsidiary raised the constitutional challenge
to the unitary taxing scheme in a California state court, and the
foreign parent raised a parallel challenge in federal court." The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit permitted
the federal action to go forward, holding that the foreign parent had
standing to raise the constitutional claim and that there was no
basis for abstaining." The Supreme Court reversed.86
The Court first held that the foreign parent had standing under
Article III of the United States Constitution. 7 In order to satisfy
the requirements of Article IHI standing, a litigant must show (1)
that "he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant""' and
(2) that "the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action'
and 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.""" The
foreign parents easily met these tests. The increased tax burden on
the foreign parents was certainly an injury-in-fact, and the injury
was fairly traceable to the defendant's administration of an
allegedly unconstitutional unitary taxing scheme.'
Article II standing is only one part of the standing inquiry in
federal court, however. Federal courts have created various
"prudential requirements" that, in an appropriate case, may be
used to dismiss a federal suit.' One such requirement is that "the
plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests,
and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of
third parties."' Arguably, a foreign parent could not satisfy this
83. 110 S. Ct. 661 (1990).
84. Alcan Aluminium Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 860 F.2d 688, 691 (7th Cir.
1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 661 (1990).
85. 860 F.2d at 699-700.
86. 110 S. Ct. 661 (1990).
87. Id. at 664-65.
88. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). See Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464,472 (1982).
89. Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)).
90. Alcan Aluminium, 110 S. Ct. at 665.
91. See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTs, § 13 (4th ed. 1983).
92. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
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test since it is the domestic subsidiary rather than the foreign parent
which is being taxed. Following this line of reasoning, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals had previously denied standing to a
foreign parent to challenge California's unitary taxing scheme."
The Seventh Circuit had come to a different conclusion in Alcan
Aluminium.'
The Supreme Court could not avoid deciding the Article III
standing issue, 'since Article III standing is a constitutional
prerequisite to the exercise of federal court jurisdiction." The
Court did not have a constitutional obligation to address the
prudential standing issue, however, and the Court chose not to
resolve the issue in this case.' Instead, the Court simply assumed
that there was standing, and then held that the suit must be
dismissed in any event as barred by the Tax Injunction Act."
The Tax Injunction Act provides as follows:
"[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment,
levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."'
The Seventh Circuit had held that the foreign parent's action was
not barred by the Tax Injunction Act because it was clear that the
foreign parent has no remedy under state law; the California
procedures may be utilized only by the taxpayer."
The Supreme Court took a different view of the Tax Injunction
Act. Although the Act requires that there be a "plain, speedy and
efficient remedy" in state court, the Act does not by its terms
require that that remedy be pursuable by the federal plaintiff.
Noting that the federal plaintiffs here, as sole shareholders and
corporate parents, exercised complete control over the domestic
subsidiaries, the Court held that the Tax Injunction Act barred a
93. Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593,595 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1012
(1983).
94. Alcan Aluminium, 860 F.2d at 700.
95. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260
(1977).
96. See C. Wiuoirr, LAw OF FEDERAL Coutms, § 13.
97. Alcan Aluminium, 110 S. Ct. at 666.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
99. 860 F.2d at 698.
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federal action when the federal plaintiff controls an entity that can
raise the constitutional claim in a state court action.' ®
Turning to the requirement that the state remedy be "plain,
speedy and efficient," the Court first assumed that such a remedy
existed and then put the burden of proving that there was no such
remedy upon the foreign parent. 1' Although the foreign parents
had a reasonable argument that a state court would not permit the
domestic subsidiary to raise a challenge under the foreign
commerce clause (since the injury is to the foreign parent), the
foreign parents could not cite any California authority to
demonstrate that a California court would refuse to hear such a
claim, and there was one contrary decision from an intermediate
California court."° The Court held that the foreign parents had
not met the burden of proving that there was no adequate remedy
in state court, and the Court unanimously dismissed the federal
action."13
This case should serve as yet another reminder to corporate
counsel and litigators that, given the Court's present position on
federalism issues, state courts should be given serious initial
consideration as to the choice of forum. A federal court should be
sought only as a last resort and only when it is demonstrably clear
that federal court jurisdiction exists (and in the context of a case
that might involve abstention, such as where a state court action is
already pending, this may involve making a clear showing that the
state court has no power to adjudicate the claim).
100. 110 S. Ct. at 666.
101. Id. See, e.g., Pennzoil v. Texaco, 107 S. CL 1519 (1987); Middlesex County Ethics Comm.
v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 432 (1979).
See generally L. TRBE, AMERICAN CONSTITIONAL LAw, § 3-30 (2d ed. 1988).
102. See Mercedes-Benz of North America v. State Board of Equalization, 127 Cal. App. 3d
871, 874, 179 Cal. Rptr. 758, 760 (1982).
103. Alcan Aluminium, 110 S. Ct. at 667.
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E. Kirkpatrick, Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics - The Act of
State Doctrine and Foreign Corrupt Practices
Commercial bribery is an unfortunate reality of certain
transnational commercial transactions. In order to secure contracts
with a foreign government, a hungry contractor may make
payments or kickbacks to high government officials - often
labelled "commissions" - in return for receiving the government's
business. In reaction to these practices, the Congress enacted and
the President signed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which
prohibits such activity by United States companies.'"
Kirkpatrick, Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics is a civil suit
brought by the losing bidder against a contractor who was awarded
a military contract by a foreign government as a result of bribes
paid to foreign officials. After the successful bidder, W.S.
Kirkpatrick & Co., was awarded a military contract by the
government of Nigeria, the losing bidder, Environmental Tectonics
Corporation ("ETC"), learned that its bid had been lower than
Kirkpatrick's, and ETC decided to investigate the circumstances
under which the contract had been awarded. It discovered
Kirkpatrick's bribery scheme, and reported its findings to the
United States Embassy in Lagos, Nigeria. Following an
investigation by the United States Justice Department, Kirkpatrick
and Carpenter, high company officials in Kirkpatrick & Co., were
charged with violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. They
each pleaded guilty to one violation of the Act.'"'
Not satisfied with having exposed Kirkpatrick's illegal practices,
ETC shortly thereafter filed an action, for damages against
Kirkpatrick & Co. under the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Acts,'" the New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act,'"
and the Robinson-Patman Act."' Among other pre-trial
challenges to the lawsuit, Kirkpatrick & Co. asserted that the act
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1988).
105. Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1055-57 (3d Cir. 1988).
106. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
107. 2C NJ.C.S. §§ 41-1-41-6.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1988).
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of state doctrine barred consideration of the claims by the federal
court. The district court agreed, and dismissed the action."® The
court of appeals reversed.1" The Supreme Court granted -a writ
of certiorari and unanimously affirmed the judgment of the court
of appeals."
The act of state doctrine is a judicially-created limitation on the
exercise of federal court jurisdiction."' Early opinions by the
Court emphasized somewhat international comity as the primary
basis for the doctrine, but the Court has in modern times indicated
that the doctrine is grounded more in separation of powers
considerations."' The Court has not embraced any one statement
of the doctrine, however, and in its recent cases, the Court had
been unable to produce a majority opinion, suggesting that the
doctrine has no agreed upon purpose or contours.1
In a recent and comprehensive overview of the many
formulations of the act of state doctrine, Professor Dellapenna of
Villanova University identified four purposes which the act of state
doctrine could conceivably serve: (1) as a rule of judicial
abstention; (2) as a way of avoiding political questions; (3) as a
"super choice-of-law" rule; and (4) as a rule of repose.1
109. 659 F. Supp. 1381.
110. 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988). The Third Circuit's opinion was noted in Note,
Environmental Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc.: The Act of State Doctrine and the Problem
of Judicial Inconsistency, 14 N.CJ. INT'L L & COM. REo. 495 (1989).
111. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990).
112. The literature on the act of state doctrine would fill a small library. Two recent
contributions especially worth consulting are Dellapenna, Deciphering the Act of State Doctrine, 35
Via. L. REv. 1, 30-53 (1990) and Leigh, Sabbatino's Silver Anniversary and the Restatement: No
Cause for Celebration, 24 INT'L LAW. 1 (1990).
There have been a number of legislative attempts to codify or abolish the act of state doctrine,
see Dellapenna, supra, at 126-30, but Congress has limited its legislative activity to disapproving a
portion of the Court's decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (see
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d), 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1988)) (commonly known as the Hickenlooper Amendment)), and to insuring
that the enforcement of arbitral agreements will not be barred by the act of state doctrine (Pub. L
No. 100-669, § 1, 102 Stat. 3969 (1988) (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. VI 1988))).
113. Compare Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) with Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
114. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
115. Dellapenna, supra note 109, at 30-53.
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Although the Court does not explicitly rely upon any one set of
principles or purposes in its decision, the rule which the Court
adopts appears to be most consistent with what Professor
Dellapenna identifies as the most likely purpose for the doctrine:
a rule of repose that gives finality to sovereign acts.""
The Court's specific holding was that the act of state doctrine
applied only to those situations in which a decision by a court in
the United States necessarily would require a finding that a
sovereign act was invalid or ineffective."7 According to this rule,
so long as there would be no judicial determination that an act of
a foreign sovereign was invalid, the doctrine would be inapplicable
no matter how embarrassed a foreign sovereign might be by the
judicial proceedings, no matter how embarrassed the United States
government might be, and no matter how great the interference
with United State foreign policy."' This approach to the act of
state doctrine is most consistent with a rule of repose which, in
essence, grants full faith and credit to the acts of a foreign
sovereign.
The Court's bright-line rule rejects a more flexible approach to
the act of state doctrine - an approach advocated by the State
Department - that would have permitted a court in some extreme
circumstances to dismiss a suit that, although not requiring a
finding as to the legal validity of a foreign sovereign's actions,
would have nevertheless significantly impaired the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy. "9 Although the Court's opinion suggests a bright-
116. Id. at 45-53.
117. "'In every case in which we have held the act of state doctrine applicable, the relief sought
or the defense interposed would have required a court in the United States to declare invalid the
official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory." 110 S. Ct. at 704.
118. It may be, however, that independent separation of powers concerns would counsel judicial
abstention in such a case. If so, then the Court's decision in Kirkpatrick can be viewed as a rather
technical one in which the Court narrows the scope of the act of state doctrine itself but leaves open
other independent bases for refusing to go forward. Even this technical adjustment in the law would
be welcome, since it would at least clarify the limited reach of the act of state doctrine.
119. -It is one thing to suggest, as we have, that the policies underlying the act of state doctrine
should be considered in deciding whether, despite the doctrine's technical availability, it should
nonetheless not be invoked; it is something quite different to suggest that those underlying policies
are a doctrine unto themselves, justifying expansion of the act of state doctrine (or, as the United
States puts it, unspecified 'related principles of abstention') into new and uncharted fields." Id. at
706-07.
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line rule, the rule is technically dicta. The State Department had
indicated in its letter to the district court that litigation of this case
would not significantly impair the conduct of foreign policy.
Accordingly, the Court did not need in its opinion to decide
whether the act of state doctrine would be available in such a
case.' There thus remains some small room for arguing that the
act of state doctrine should apply even when the legal validity of
a foreign sovereign's actions are not in issue.
Ill. PREVIEW OF 1990-91 TERM
A. Floyd v. Eastern Airlines' - Liability under Section 17 of
the Warsaw Convention for Purely Emotional Injury
In this case, the plaintiffs were passengers on an Eastern Airlines
flight from Miami to Nassau, Bahamas. After take-off, all three
engines failed, and the crew informed the passengers that they
would be forced to ditch the plane in the Atlantic Ocean. A
disaster was averted when the crew restarted the engines, and the
plane landed safely back in Miami.
The plaintiffs filed suit against Eastern, asserting claims under
both the Warsaw Convention and under state law. Emotional
distress was the only damage claimed in the original complaint.
The district court dismissed all claims. The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the district court's judgment. The Supreme
Court has granted a writ of certiorari to consider only the following
questions:
(1) In view of presumed liability under Warsaw Convention for death,
wounding, or any other bodily injury, is air carrier liable for fright, psychic
injury, or emotional distress absent objective bodily injury or absent any
physical manifestations of injury? (2) Does Montreal Agreement, which
modifies Warsaw Convention and which eliminates air carrier's "'due care"
defense, make international air carriers insurers of their passengers against
any fright, psychic injury, or emotional distress absent showing of objective
120. This may explain why the Court was able to issue a unanimous opinion here while in
Dunhill, the Court could not even forge a majority.
121. 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989) cert. granted 59 U.S.L.W. 3018 (July 17, 1990).
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bodily injury or absent physical manifestations of injury?"
Although the court has granted certiorari on two questions, only
the first question is significant. The second question concerns the
Montreal Agreement, which has never come into force and did not
modify the terms of the Warsaw Convention. Moreover, the court
of appeals did not hold that the Montreal Agreement created
liability where none existed under the Warsaw Convention. The
second question is thus likely to be ignored by the Court.
The first question, however, is of vital interest, and it appears
that the Eleventh Circuit will be reversed. In its most recent case
under the Warsaw Convention, the Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Justice Scalia, applied a "plain meaning" approach to
interpretation of the Warsaw Convention. The Court explained as
follows:
We must thus be governed by the text solemnly adopted by the
governments of many separate nations whatever conclusions might be
drawn from the intricate drafting history that petitioners and the Solicitor
General have brought to our attention. The latter may of course be
consulted to elucidate a text that is ambiguous, see, e.g., Air France v.
Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985). But where the text is clear, as it is here, we
have no power to insert an amendment."
The text at issue in Eastern Airlines is found in Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention. French is the governing text for the Warsaw
Convention,' and Article 17 provides as follows in the French
version:
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de mort, de
blessure ou de toute autre lesion corporelle subie par un voyaguer lorsque
l'accident qui a cause le dommage s'est produit a bord de l'aeronef ou au
cours de toutes operations d'embarquement et de debarquement."
A roughly literal translation of the first portion of Article 17 is that
"The carrier is responsible for damages sustained in case of death,
of wounding or of all other bodily injuries suffered by a
passenger.""
122. Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 59 U.S.LW. 3018 (July 17, 1990).
123. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 109 S. Ct. 1676, 1683-84 (1989).
124. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985).
125. Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d at 1471.
126. See id. (citing the unofficial translation at 49 Stat 3014, reprinted at note following 49
U.S.C. § 1502 (1988).
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The plain meaning of Article 17 would seem to exclude recovery
for purely emotional harm. Indeed, the court of appeals recognized
in its opinion that a literal interpretation of the phrase "lesion
corporelle" would exclude recovery for purely emotional harm.'27
This interpretation is further confirmed by the other two items in
the list, "mort" (death) and "blessure" (wounding), both of which
relate to physical, as opposed to emotional harm. The maxim of
statutory construction ejusdem generis would appropriately be
applied here."~
The court of appeals rejected this narrow construction of Article
17, but its arguments are ultimately not convincing. The most
serious mistake which the court makes is to rely heavily upon
French law in deciding that a recovery for mental distress is
possible under Article 17. The mistake is made early in the court's
analysis. The court cites Air France v. Saks for the proposition
that "we are required to determine the French legal meaning of the
Convention's terms." ' 9 This is a correct statement of law, since
the official draft of the Convention is in French.
But when the court of appeals finds that the term "lesion
corporelle" has no meaning in French law, the court then embarks
on an exegesis of French law. In particular, the court notes that
French law makes no distinction between physical injury and
purely mental or emotional injury."3 Instead, the court continues,
French law distinguishes only between "dommage materiel" and
"dommage moral."'' The court then concludes its analysis with
a non-sequitur, arguing that if the drafters had intended to exclude
any particular type of damage, they would have used the terms
127. 872 F.2d at 1471.
128. Professor Karl Llewellyn explained ejusdem generis as follows in his leading article on
statutory construction: -It is a general rule of construction that where general words follow an
enumeration they are to be held as applying only to persons and things of the same general kind or
class specifically mentioned." Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons about how Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 405 (1950).
129. 872 F.2d at 1470.
130. Id. at 1472.
131. Id. at 1472. The court explains as follows: "'Dommage materiel consists of pecuniary loss
resulting from injury, such as compensation -for expenses or financial loss resulting from injury or
death, medical and funeral expenses, and loss of earning power or income. Dommage moral refers
to intangible losses such as pain and suffering, invasion of privacy, or disfiguration." Id. at n.16.
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"dommage materiel" and "dommage moral." Since they used the
term "lesion corporelle," which, according to the court "does not
readily evoke a sharp distinction of French law,"" the drafters
must have intended not to exclude any particular type of damage.
It seems much more likely, however, that if the drafters used a
term that had no counterpart in French law, the drafters probably
intended to reach a result that had no counterpart in French law.
Namely, the drafters may have intended to restrict recovery under
the Warsaw Convention to purely physical harm, and to exclude
recovery for purely emotional harm. The court's heavy reliance
upon substantive French law - even when the Convention does not
use words that "readily evoke" French law - leaves the opinion
open to the criticism that its approach would leave us "forever
chained to French law."' 33 We should expect the Supreme Court
to reverse and hold that Article 17 does not create a cause of action
for purely emotional harm.
B. The New Justice: David H. Souter
On the last day of the Court's term, Justice William J. Brennan
announced his resignation from the Court after 34 years of service.
President Bush shortly thereafter announced his nomination to
succeed Justice Brennan: Judge David Souter, who had been only
recently appointed by President Bush to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit. The Senate confirmed the nomination
and Justice Souter joined the Court on October 9, 1990.
Foreigners may be surprised to learn that little is known about
Judge Souter's judicial philosophy. Foreigners may be even more
surprised to learn that the lack of information about Judge Souter
was considered by many to be the primary reason President Bush
selected him. Unlike Judge Robert Bork, whose nomination by
President Reagan was defeated largely because his well-known
views on controversial issues of constitutional law, such as
132. Id.
133. Air France, 470 U.S. at 399 (quoting Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d 385,
394, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 102, 314 N.E.2d 848, 853 (1974)).
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abortion, made him a target for liberal interest groups, Justice
Souter was a "teflon" nominee - someone whom no interest group
can pin down.
Justice Souter was educated at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar and
then at Harvard Law School. He practiced law for only two years
before joining the Office of Attorney General of the State of New
Hampshire. Working his way up the ranks of that office, Judge
Souter ultimately was appointed Attorney General of the state.
Justice Souter served for many years on the New Hampshire
Supreme Court and his opinions while serving on that court give
the clearest picture of his judicial philosophy."3
However, at least with respect to federal issues, the picture is not
complete. Most of Souter's opinions on the court involved
criminal matters under state law, His views on civil rights and
abortion are as yet unknown.
The good news is that his opinions on the New Hampshire
Supreme Court were well-drafted, with particular care and attention
given to the facts of prior cases. Souter's opinions do not have the
air of controversy about them; they appear, rather, to be well-
grounded in prior law and reasoning. Press reports have suggested
that Souter patterns himself on Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
which would be consistent with his style of judicial opinion-
writing.
The only specific clue as to Souter's judicial philosophy is found
in his written answers to the Senate Judiciary Committee's judicial
evaluation questionnaire. In response to a question concerning
judicial activism, Souter wrote:
The obligation of any judge is to decide the case before the court, and the
nature of the issue presented will largely determine the appropriate scope
of the principle on which its decision should rest. Where that principle is
not provided and controlled by black letter authority or existing precedent,
the decision must honor the distinction between personal and judicially
cognizable values.
Souter's confirmation hearing did not produce any significant
revelations. Like most nominees, Justice Souter avoided answering
134. Indeed, during his short tenure on the federal appeals court, Judge Souter did not have the
opportunity to write a single opinion.
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specific questions concerning issues, such as abortion, which are
presently before the Court. Court observers simply will have to
wait and see how Justice Souter rules while on the Court.
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